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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS' DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES 
MARVIN E. KANNE 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
Saint Thomas Aquinas holds that scientific knowledge is attained 
when observable phenomena and their properties are accounted for in 
terms of their relations to their causes. On establishing the divisions of 
the sciences, Aquinas follows the threefold division of the speculative 
sciences as proposed by Aristotle and handed on to the Middle Ages 
by Boethius: natural philosophy, mathematics, and theology. Each 
science is defined by its subject matter and by its method of procedure. 
While Aquinas followed the teachings of Boethius on this point, 
he makes significant additions and alterations. Thus in his analysis 
Aquinas focuses his attention on the role played by the in tellect in the 
determination of the formal perspective (ratio) from which the intellect 
considers the various matters of science. 
For Aquinas the intellect performs two operations: apprehension 
and judgment. Here we shall be concerned with the operation of appre-
hension. This operation of the intellect is capable of two distinct kinds 
of abstraction. First, there is the abstraction of form from sensible 
matter. Second, there is the abstraction by which a universal is ab-
stracted from its particular. The objects of the operation called abstrac-
tion of form are the objects of mathematics, and the objects of the 
abstraction of the universal are the objects of science. Hence, the 
intellect by means of its powers of abstraction plays a fundamental 
role in establishing the division of the sciences. 
t t t 
Wrule Saint Thomas draws no clear distinction between 
science and philosophy, today many philosophers and scien-
tists sharply distinguish between the two enterprises. In this 
century an ideal of scientific knowledge is mathematical 
physics with its use of precise calculations and a highly refined 
method involving experimentation, formation of hypotheses, 
and their verification. Aquinas' ideal, however, is different. 
,~quinas holds there are four distinct types of cause: material, 
IOfmal, final, and efficient. Scientific knowledge is a knowl-
edge of things through these causes. Following Aristotle's 
lead, Aquinas holds that scientific knowledge is attained when 
", .. we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the 
:ause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact 
:ould not be other than it is" (Aquinas, 1955, 1941). 
For Saint Thomas, scientific knowledge is not attained 
by recording observable connections in nature and then cal-
culating them in mathematical terms. When the observable 
phenomena of nature and their properties are accounted for 
in terms of their necessary relations to their causes, then we 
have scientific knowledge. Insofar as we pursue a knowledge 
of nature through its causes, our inquiry, according to 
Aquinas, will ultimately be metaphysical; this is science at 
its best. Science, then, does not aim at empirical knowledge 
gained through experimentation, but rather at a knowledge 
of the being and intelligible structures of things as seen in rela-
tion to their ultimate causes. In short, Aquinas holds the goal 
of scientific inquiry to be metaphysical, not empirical. 
Saint Thomas gives his views on the hierarchy and meth-
odology of the sciences in several of his works, but his most 
extensive and penetrating treatment of these subjects can be 
found in Questions Five and Six of his unfinished "Commen-
tary on Boethius' De Trinitate." In this paper I will center my 
attention on this work. 
Aquinas follows the threefold division of the speculative 
sciences as proposed by Aristotle (I941) and as handed on to 
the Middle Ages by Boethius: natural philosophy, mathe-
matics, and theology. Each of these sciences is defined by its 
subject matter and by its method of procedure. St. Thomas 
followed the teacrung of Boethius on this point; however, as 
we will see, he made significant additions and alterations. 
To grasp the extent of these changes, let us briefly con-
sider Boetruus' view of the sciences. According to Boethius, 
the sciences were concerned with the forms, and the hierarchy 
of the sciences corresponded exactly to the hierarchy of the 
forms as found in the real world in their various degrees of 
separation from matter. Consequently, natural prulosophy 
studied the forms of bodies along with the bodies in wruch 
these forms existed. Mathematics studied forms of bodies 
apart from the matter of the bodies, e.g., lines, circles, etc. 
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Theology studies forms that are entirely separate from matter, 
e.g., God (Aquinas, 1963). 
From this it is clear that Boethius had based his division 
of the sciences on what he took to be the objective division 
of reality. The branches of the sciences corresponded exactly 
to the order of the forms, which were arranged in an ascending 
hierarchy according to their degree of separation from matter. 
For Boethius there was no need to investigate the acts of the 
intellect by wlUch the different objects of the sciences were 
comprehended. The intellect merely had to follow the division 
of the forms that it found ready-made in the world. 
In the case of mathematics there was an opportunity for 
discussing the intellectual act whereby the object was attained, 
for, while actually existing in ma Uer, mathematical forms 
were to be considered separate from matter. It was this op-
portunity which Aquinas exploited to present his own ad-
ditions and alterations, which were to show the essential 
role played by the intellect in the determination of the sub-
jects of the sciences. No longer were the sciences to be differ-
entiated solely according to the distinction of the forms as 
discovered ready-made in the world, but rather according to 
the distinctions the mind itself made in the course of investi-
gating reality. Each science was still to be differentiated by 
its own subject. However, by the subject of a science Aquinas 
did not simply mean the things considered by the science, or 
its subject matter. Rather, the term "subject" designated the 
formal perspective (ratio) from which the intellect considered 
the various matters of science (Aquinas, 1963). 
If we examine the operations of the intellect and the 
distinctions it makes, our understanding of Aquinas' division 
of the sciences will be enhanced. St. Thomas held that the 
intellect basically performs two operations. First, there is the 
understanding or apprehension of intelligible objects. By this 
act we know more or less what things are, i.e., we grasp their 
essences. Second, there is the operation of judgment, by which 
we compose or divide what we have grasped in apprehension. 
For example, understanding what green is and what grass is, 
we unite the two in the affirmative judgment "Grass is green." 
Or, understanding what an animal is and what a stone is, we 
divide the two by saying "An animal is not a stone." In 
making judgments, then, the intellect grasps not only the 
essence of things but also their existence. That is, the second 
operation of the intellect deals with how tlUngs exist. These 
two operations correspond to what Aquinas held to be the two 
principles of reality: the first operation is directed to the 
essence of a being, and the second focuses on its existence 
(I 963). 
When the intellect judges correctly, it conforms to reality. 
Consequently, in judging, the intellect cannot correctly ab-
stract what is united in reality. The intellect can only correct-
ly judge to be separate what is in reality separate. When the 
judgments of the intellect fail to conform to reality, it is in 
error (Aquinas, 1963). 
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However, Aquinas did hold that by means of the fi 
rSI 
operation of the intellect one could correctly abstract sOIll 
things that are not separate in reality. There are two distin ( 
kinds of abstractions. First, there is the abstraction by Whi~ 
quiddities of things are conceived. Here we have what AqUin , 
referred to as the abstraction of form from sensible matte~ 
this belongs to mathematics. Second, there is the abstractiot 
by which a universal is abstracted from a particular. l'hil 
belongs to science insofar as the sciences disregard accidental 
features and treat only of necessary matters. (It should be 
noted that for Aquinas these two kinds of abstraction COr. 
respond to the two modes of union: union of form and mat. 
ter and union of part and whole.) (Aquinas, 1963). 
When that which constitutes the intelligibility of any 
nature has a relational dependence on something else, We 
cannot understand that nature apart from that on which it 
depends. However, if one thing does not depend on another as 
regards what constitutes the intelligibility of that nature, then 
the intellect can abstract the one from the other. This remains 
true regardless of whether the two things are united or separ. 
ated in reality. Hence, a part can be understood without the 
whole, as a letter can be understood without a syllable, but 
not vice versa (Aquinas, 1941). 
Let us now turn to the abstraction of the form (abstractio 
jeJrrnac). St. Thomas points out in Question Five, Article Three 
of IUs "Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate" that " ... a 
form can be abstracted from matter if the essential nature of 
the form does not depend on that particular kind of matter; 
but the intellect cannot abstract form from the kind of matter 
upon wlUch the form depends according to its essential na· 
ture" (Aquinas, 1963). Since all accidents are related to sub· 
stance as form to matter, and since every accident of its nature 
depends on substance, no accidental form can be separated 
from substance. However, accidents befall substance in a 
definitely ordered fashion: first quantity, then qualities-
after that passivities and motion. Hence, quantity can be con· 
sidered before the sensible qualities. That is, for Aquinas 
quantity did not depend upon sensible matter but only intel· 
ligible matter. After the accidents have been abstracted, espe· 
cially the sensible qualities, substance is intelligible to the 
intellect alone, for substance is beyond the comprehension of 
the sense powers. The objects of the operation called abstrac· 
tion of form are the objects of mathematics. For Aquinas the 
mathematician considers substance as quantified apart from 
all qualitative characteristics. Such considerations are possible 
because of the intellect's ability to abstract. 
To comprehend this better it will be helpful to turn to 
one of St. Thomas' later works, the Summa Thcologiae. While 
reiterating his position on the operation of the intellect, in 
the First Part, Question Eighty-five, Article One, "Reply to 
Objection Two," St. Thomas gives a more detailed account 
of his doctrine of matter. Aquinas considered matter as being 
two-fold: common and signate (or individual matter). Common 
tter for example, could be flesh and bones, and individual ilIa ' 
tter this flesh and these bones which make up my body. Ina 
The intellect can abstract the species (form) of a natural thing 
'om individual sensible matter. However, it cannot abstract 
t; from the common sensible matter. For example, the intel-
:ect abstracts the species of man from this flesh and these 
bones which belong to the notion of individual. However, 
when considering the species of man it cannot abstract from 
flesh and bones, i.e., common matter. 
Mathematical species, as opposed to natural species, can 
be abstracted from sensible matter: both individual and 
common. However, mathematical species cannot be abstracted 
from common intelligible matter. Sensible matter is corporeal 
matter, and it is subjected to such sensible qualities as cold 
or hot, hard or soft, etc. Since quantity is ontologically prior 
to all the other qualities, the terminations of quantity, such 
as number, dimension, and figure, can be considered apart 
from the sensible qualities. When one studies mathematics, 
one is abstracting from sensible matter. However, these mathe-
matical terminations cannot be considered apart from sub-
stance as subject to quantity. To do so would be to abstract 
from intelligible matter. Yet, they can be considered apart 
from any given substance, for this is to abstract from individ-
ual intelligible matter (Aquinas, 1941). 
Consequently, the abstraction in mathematics is not an 
abstraction of an accidental form of quantity considered apart 
from substance, for quantity necessarily inheres in substance. 
That is, quantity does not exist as an independent form. In 
Question Forty, Article Three of the First Part of the Summa 
The%giae, Aquinas writes (1941): 
.. , in the abstraction of form from the matter, both the 
fornl and matter remain in the intellect; as, for instance, 
if we abstract the form of a circle from brass there re-
mains in our intellect separately the understanding both 
cf a circle and of brass. 
Let us now turn our attention to the abstraction of a 
whole (aDstractio to tius) , which is performed by the natural 
philosopher. The abstractio totius is the absolute considera-
tion of some essence apart from the individuals whose nature 
it is, The individuals are, so to speak, "parts" from which 
nature a, a "whole" is abstracted (Aquinas, 1963). Such an 
abstraciion is legitinlate if the nature of the whole does not 
depend on the parts, such that the being of a particular whole 
~ constituted by the composition of a particular part, as a 
, syllable is composed of letters. In other words, such an ab-
stractio to tius is legitimate insofa r as the parts are accidental 
to the whole. The natural philosopher cannot abstract from 
the esseniial "parts" of his subject matter. That is, he cannot 
abstract from those "parts" that necessarily belong to the 
Subject ma tier and are included in its definition. For example, 
Since Ilnttcr and form are both necessary pariS of a material 
being, he cannot absl ract from them, However, he can abstract 
from any given individual, for he does not consider natures 
as subject to here and now. 
Let me expand on this point. The natural philosopher 
does not study something insofar as it is individuated by 
matter of determinate dimensions (Aquinas, 1963). To grasp 
what Aquinas has in mind here we must return to the Summa 
Theologiae where he treats of the twofold division of matter: 
common and signate (or individual). As mentioned before, an 
example of common matter could be flesh and bones, and 
individual matter could be this flesh and these bones. In 
natural philosophy the intellect abstracts the species (form) 
from the sensible matter, but not from common sensible mat-
ter. So, for example, the species (form) of man is abstracted 
from this flesh and these bones. When speaking of particular 
flesh and particular bones, one is concerned with a particular 
individual as such, and not with the species of man. It is the 
latter which is of concern to the natural philosopher. How-
ever, what is important to note is that according to AqUinas' 
doctrine the species of man cannot be abstracted from 
common sensible matter, i.e, flesh and bones. A natural species 
such as that of man cannot be thought apart from indetermin-
ate matter. Hence, the nature of man can be considered with-
out considering particular flesh and particular bones, but it 
cannot be considered absolutely apart from flesh and bones, 
Such an abstraction is said to be the abstraction of a universal 
from a particular, or abstractio totius, and it forms the basis 
of science. 
If these remarks are correct, we can draw a few conclu-
sions regarding Aquinas' view of scientific activity. Given his 
doctrine of substance, we can conclude that for Aquinas the 
general object of the scientist's studies is the world we all 
know. Aquinas is not subscribing to some variant of idealism. 
The different scientific disciplines are generated by the fact 
that man can consider the things of nature from different 
perspectives. For example, a psychologist can study the men-
tal processes and emotional and behavioral characteristics of 
a man and leave out of consideration (abstract from) his vital 
processes, such as heartbeat. However, in the concrete, no man 
actually exists in such a split-level fashion. Each of us exists 
as an unitary whole. 
What enables the scientist to develop these different 
perspectives? Aquinas holds that the division of the sciences 
can be accounted for when we realize that the intellect can 
actively leave out of consideration certain characteristics. 
A more traditional empiricist view which considers ·the mind 
as fundamentally passive would find it difficult to account 
for this division. For example, when we observe a man, we 
do not observe his emotional and behavioral characteristics 
apart from his vital processes. We observe a unitary being. 
Nevertheless, we recognize psychology and physiology as 
distinct disciplines, and in terms of Aquinas this is because 
the intellect plays an active role in scientific activity. 
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